Corbett and Jones (2000) point to the disparities which exist in the Namibian conservancy legal construct between the intent of policy, the provisions of legislation and the actual implementation of conservancy programmes.

• In policy, conservancies are intended to gain the same rights as freehold farmers and the legislation provides for this. In practice, the Ministry of Environment (MET) sets quotas for huntable game 'for own use' and requires conservancies to obtain permits.
• Although there is no legal provision for it, MET is requiring conservancies to submit management plans before quotas for trophy hunting and 'own use' are issued.
• In policy, conservancies should decide on tourism concessions: in practice MET has renewed expired concessions and issued new concessions in conservancies without consultation.
• In policy, conservancies should be able to enter into joint ventures with the private sector as a bilateral agreement: in practice, there is a tendency by government to interpret policy as giving it a right to approve joint venture agreements.

From these examples, it is clear that full devolution of authority has not taken place. Murphree (2000) stresses that the purpose of devolution is to achieve the alignment of authority, responsibility and incentives - authority without responsibility is meaningless or obstructive, responsibility without authority cannot be effective and, without responsibility or authority, there are no incentives to invest, manage or control.

Many planners and bureaucrats see devolution of power as a step-by-step process under which communities are granted powers incrementally as they demonstrate the ability to manage. This is 'Catch 22'. Authority is a pre requisite for responsible management and should not be held out as a reward for it. Devolution carries with it the responsibility for organisation, management, control, self sufficiency and, above all, for developing resourcefulness. These attributes cannot be imposed but must be developed experimentally in the local setting and, without authority, such experiments are defective. The stimulus arises not from the anticipation of future entitlement but from the imperative of immediate empowerment.

Corbett and Jones (2000, page 18) are critical of a tendency amongst government and NGOs to replicate their own bureaucratic systems and formalistic approaches to planning in conservancies. They point out the heavy burden of transaction costs which this imposes on communities. An outsider is left with the impression that there is still a high degree of 'nurse-maiding' attached to conservancies, an anxiety that communities should adopt the value-systems of the supporting agencies, a drive to "get things right first time" and a reluctance to allow communities to make mistakes - an essential element of the learning process. The failure of the State and NGOs to treat land use as an experiment requiring considerable freedom of experimentation may lead to a "socially constructed stalemate" (Lee 1993, page 12).

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